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9.1  Introduction and Summary 
The objective of this paper is twofold, first, to evaluate U.S. pressure for 
economic liberalization in Japan; second, to discuss its implications for eco- 
nomic and political aspects of the East Asian regional future. 
I argue that there have been three types of U.S. pressure on Japan: (1) the 
traditional  type  with  voluntary export restraints  (VERs) and other  export- 
limiting measures on Japan; (2)  the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) type 
in which market access of Japan improves the Japanese consumers’ welfare; 
and  (3) the  super 301 type  in  which unilateral  U.S.  gains are  sought (see 
table 9.1). 
Although various administrations of the United States have put pressure on 
Japan to limit exports (starting with cotton textiles in  1956), the efforts by 
the Reagan-Bush administration throughout the  1980s have been marked by 
widened coverage of  issues and heightened  political tensions.  Rather than 
more import quotas and VERs, the United States demanded market access and 
market shares in Japan. The logic was clear. It is better to increase U.S. exports 
to Japan, achieving an equilibrium with higher volume, than to limit Japan’s 
exports to the United States, achieving an equilibrium with lower volume. 
Financial deregulation in Japan was explicitly mentioned in the Yen-Dollar 
Agreement in May  1984. More liberalized financial markets were supposed to 
invite foreign investment and financial companies to Japan, thus correcting for 
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Table 9.1  Types  of Trade Conflicts between the United States and Japan 
Winners  Losers  Examples 
Export-limiting measures:  U.S. producers  US.  consumers  Textiles, color TVs, 
VERs and OMAs  steel, machine 
tools, autos 
Japanese producers  Japanese producers 
(long run)  (short run) 
Market access measures:  Japanese  Japanese producers  Large retail store law, 
MOSS-SII type  consumers 








Revisionist measures:  U.S. producers  Japanese producers  Semiconductor 
results-oriented type  Japanese  agreement, super 
consumers  301, January 
1992 agreement 
on U.S. autos 
Note:  Winners and losers can be verified using a standard partial equilibrium model. 
the dollar overvaluation at that time. The Market-Oriented  Sector Selective 
(MOSS) talks targeted several products. Beef and citrus became symbolic is- 
sues of the mid-1980s. In 1987, the SII started to address many issues in the 
Japanese economy. Among others, the large retail store law in Japan was heav- 
ily criticized by the United States. The law, the United States contended, pre- 
vents  an  expansion  of  the  number of  large  retail  stores (such  as discount 
stores), which carry more imports than do traditional comer stores, thus con- 
tributing to lower imports of manufactured goods. The single most important 
issue concerning import restrictions and market access of Japan at present is 
how to liberalize rice imports. At the Uruguay Round, the United States in- 
sisted that Japan move to the tariff system and gradually reduce the tariff rate, 
while Japan insisted on exceptional treatment of rice for Japan. 
The pattern of the United States’ pressuring Japan and Japan’s conceding to 
U.S. demands is best understood as a reflection of domestic politics in the two 
countries. In the United States, with the split government in the 1980s,  external 
economic issues, especially mounting trade deficits, were used, or exploited, 
as effective political charges and countercharges. Congress tends to blame the 
president for lack of a program to reduce the current account deficits, and at- 
tempts to take matters into its own hands, as in the Omnibus Trade Bill with 
super  301.  The  administration,  especially  the  U.S.  Trade  Representative 
(USTR), trying to head off congressional meddling, pushed Japan to agree on 
a series of “liberalizations.” 
In some quarters in the Japanese government, the U.S. demands were seen 393  U.S.  Political Pressure and Economic Liberalization in East Asia 
as “foreign pressure,” which would help dismantle vested interest with minimal 
political costs. The U.S. pressure was perceived as something beyond the Japa- 
nese government’s control, so that no one, neither government officials nor 
politicians, had to assume responsibility for taking away vested interests and 
oligopolistic rents from producers and big corporations. 
In summary, U.S. pressure of the SII type was used to liberalize and deregu- 
late the Japanese economy, benefiting Japanese consumers and foreign produc- 
ers. It recently backfired, however, because the ritual of U.S. “bullying,” if not 
“bashing,” Japan and Japan’s giving “concessions” produced anti-Japan senti- 
ment in the United States and dislike of the United States in Japan. The rela- 
tionship in the 1990s will be much more strained than before. 
The new  type of  U.S. pressure is unilateralism, pursuing U.S. unilateral 
gains. U.S. demands became more results oriented; that is, the United States 
defines a market share in Japan in an agreement and has Japan commit to it 
under threat of retaliatory measures. 
The target of U.S. demands has not been limited to Japan but includes other 
Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan. Textile VERs were also applied 
for these countries in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, Korea and Taiwan 
were accused of artificially pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar so that 
their exports to the United States did not decrease after the sharp yen apprecia- 
tion triggered by  the Plaza Agreement. 
U.S. demands for economic liberalizations in Japan and other Asian coun- 
tries have several implications. First, if the current tendency of U.S. demands 
cum Japanese concessions continues, Japanese resentment against the United 
States may turn into a desire to have stronger relations with Asian neighbors. 
However, this possibility is limited by lack of political leadership in Japan and 
by suspicious reactions to Japanese overtures by Asian neighbors. Second, fast- 
growing intraregional trades have been rather specialized. Typically, Japan ex- 
ports parts and intermediate goods, and newly industrialized economies (NIEs) 
export final goods to the United States. Unless Japan imports much more from 
Asian neighbors, it would not replace the United States as an absorber of Asian 
goods. Hence, the link between Japan and the Asian countries remains weak. 
In other words, Japan is not ready to take a leadership role to replace the United 
States in the Asian region as a nexus of political and economic links. 
Signs of change, however, are abundant. Japan for the first time sent mine 
sweepers to the Persian Gulf, though after the war. This is regarded as a sign 
of change in Japan’s commitment to political change. Japan’s trade structures 
are rapidly changing, partly due to U.S. demands. The share of manufactured 
imports now reaches almost 50 percent. Japan may  increase imports from 
Asian neighbors in the future. 
The biggest stumbling block to Japan’s becoming a regional economic and 
political leader is lack of principles. Would Japan tolerate political suppression 
to achieve an economic order? Would Japan help technological transfers with 
direct investment? Would Japan continue saving a large portion of income even 394  Takatoshi Ito 
if the standard of living were sacrificed? Asian neighbors will not fully trust 
Japanese leadership, unless the principles of the Japanese political  economy 
become clear. If Japan cannot project its economic-political principles, then 
Asian neighbors will remain suspicious of its hegemony in the region. 
9.2  United States-East  Asian Countries Conflicts, 1956-81 
9.2.1 
U.S.-Japan  ConJEicts, 1950s-1970s 
Traditional conflicts between the United States and Japan (and other East 
Asian countries) originate from sharp increases in export of a particular prod- 
uct. Producers in the United States bring complaints to the US. government, 
sometimes with formal antidumping charges but most often with political pres- 
sures. Complaints  might  start when  the  market  share  of  imports  increases 
sharply. As long as an “injury”  is felt, the level of  market share might be as 
little as 5 percent, as in the case of cotton. The U.S. government negotiates 
with the exporting country. With political pressures and threats, sometimes also 
linking other issues, the United States always succeeds, if with a long delay, in 
negotiating some kind of export-limiting measures, VERs and orderly market- 
ing agreements (OMAs).’ This pattern was repeated in cotton, synthetics, color 
TVs, steel, and automobiles, for example (table 9.2). 
The textiles issue was the first trade conflict between the United States and 
Japan in the mid-l950s, and resulted in the first VER between the two coun- 
tries in 1957.*  The textile issue, changing the focus of particular products, re- 
mained a major issue between the two countries until the 1970s. 
Hence, the traditional U.S. pressure on East Asian countries was a measure 
to limit exports, burdening the exporting countries, such as VERs or OMAs. 
The political process is like that summarized above.7 
Yoffie (1983) analyzed  the dynamics of U.S. pressures and responses by 
Conflicts of the Traditional Type 
1. See Hillman and Ursprung (1988) for why VERs could be politically preferable to tariffs. In 
the GAlT framework, tariffs  were not an  option. Yoffie  (1983) contrasts VERs of  the  1950s 
through the 1970s with tariffs in the 1930s. 
2. In 1956, the United States tried to limit Japanese exports. “Although Japanese textile imports 
represented a small portion of American consumption (approximately 2 percent), in a few catego- 
ries such as gingham, velveteen, and women’s blouses, Japanese sales were reaching two-thirds of 
apparent consumption and putting some American producers out of business” (Yoffie 1983,45). 
After several rounds of negotiation (described in Yoffie 1983.44-58),  “on January 16,  1957, the 
Departments of State, Commerce, and Agriculture released a joint statement concerning the ‘de- 
tails of the Japanese program for the control of exports of cotton textiles to the United States”’ 
(58). This set the precedent for VERs. 
3. This section is in broad agreement with opinions in Yoffie (1983), Destler and Sat0 (1982), 
Destler, Fukui, and Sato (1979), and Destler (1986). Yoffie (1983,4-5)  pointed out three charac- 
teristics of VERs and OMAs, as opposed to the interwar tariff war: (1) they are negotiated and 
bargained between two countries; (2) they use quantitative limits; (3)  they are selective and so 
























Historical Overview of U.S.-Japan  Trade Conflicts 
Cotton textiles, VER. 
Japan “voluntarily” restricted woolen fabric export (Yoffie 1983, 124). 
Negotiations started for short-term agreement under President Kennedy’s 
One-year short-term agreement on cotton textiles 
Long-term agreement on cotton textiles. 
Steel, VER (until 1974). 
Negotiations for multifiber textile arrangement started. “Textile 
The United States announced new bilateral accords with each of the four 
initiative. 
wrangle.” Linkage to Okinawa and to Nixon shocks.’ 
Asian exporters and the removal of  the 10 percent surcharge on 
textiles. 
Color  TV, OMA (until 1980). Steel, trigger pricing (until 1982). 
First automobile VER. 
Yen-dollar working group started. 
Yen-dollar working group final report. Steel, VER (renewed in 1989). 
MOSS talks. 
Senate resolution. 
Machine tools, VER. 
Semiconductor agreement. 
Findings on semiconductor agreement violation. 
Super 301 signed into law. 
Designation of Japan as an unfair trading partner. 
SII started. 
SII final reports. 
Bush-Miyazawa agreement on United States automobiles and parts 
“President Nixon announced on July  15,  1971, that he would be the first American president to 
visit Beijing and on August  15,  1971, that he would suspend the convertibility of the dollar and 
introduce a 10 percent import surcharge. 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s. 
The U.S. government aimed to maximize a political effect in appeasing domes- 
tic interest groups (complaining industry) while “minimizing” the damage to 
the international relationship. Given U.S. pressures, exporting countries are 
faced with two choices: to resist pressures or to accept VERs and OMAs. By 
resisting VER demands initiated by the administration, exporting countries run 
the risk of being restricted by  even more severe measures, such as unilateral 
quotas and high tariffs initiated by Congress. On the other hand, by accepting 
VERs and OMAs too quickly, exporting nations lose export revenues. Even 
though limited by VERs demanded by the United States, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong have managed to prosper in the long run. Their success comes 
from (1) pursuing long-run gains by upgrading products and shifting targeted 
markets; (2)  negotiating for delay, ambiguity, and flexibility; (3) demanding 
compensation for restriction (linkage); (4)  cheating outright and exploiting 
loopholes; and (5)  aiming at bureaucratic splits in the United States (Yoffie 
1983, 37). 396  Takatoshi Ito 
Automobiles 
Let us first examine the automobile VER  between the United States and 
Japan, which is in fact a traditional type of conflict. The automobile VER be- 
gan in 1981, limiting the number of exported passenger automobiles to  1.68 
million per year. This restraint was not really voluntary, but was requested by 
the United States and negotiated and agreed upon between the two countries. 
The agreement was extended for a one-year period, from April 1984 to March 
1985, with  a higher limit of  1.85 million. In  the spring of  1985, President 
Reagan announced that he would not seek an extension of  the VER, putting 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in a difficult position. 
If  the limit were  lifted, MITI feared that Japanese automobile companies 
would increase exports sharply, almost certainly causing a backlash; main- 
taining the VER lends itself to managed trade. MITI chose a new, “truly volun- 
tary” export restraint with a 2.3 million limit. The increase in the number an- 
gered Congress (It0 1992, 370-71). 
The ceiling was binding (that is, the actual number of exports was 2.3 mil- 
lion cars) only in 1985 and 1986. The number of cars exported from Japan to 
the United States declined steadily from 1987 to 1991, reflecting an increasing 
number of Japanese cars produced in the United States. Throughout the 1980s, 
the quota encouraged Japanese automakers to build factories in the United 
States, which became operational in the late 1980s. In fact, the market share 
of “Japanese brands”-a  total of those exported from Japan and made in the 
Japanese factories in North America-steadily  increased to 30 percent in the 
early  1990s. In  1992, MITI announced that the quota was lowered to  1.65 
million. 
In summary, upon the introduction of  VER, prices of  Japanese cars were 
raised, which benefited Japanese automakers as well as U.S. automakers, and 
direct investment by the Japanese makers in North America circumvented the 
re~triction.~ 
Japanese automakers proved to be competitive even in making cars on U.S. 
turf. The fact that VER does not hinder growth of  Japanese (or East Asian 
countries’) products is very familiar. The episode shares features with events in 
the textile and steel industries, described by authors such as Yoffie and Destler. 
9.2.2  Consequences 
Yoffie (1983) emphasizes the importance of dynamic responses of the Asian 
countries, quickly upgrading products and moving into the area not restricted 
by  the VER, for the success of their economic growth.5  With few exceptions, 
4. Throughout the  1980s, direct investment by  Japanese automakers in the United States was 
encouraged and welcomed by the United Auto Workers and local communities as job creation. 
5. When cotton textiles were restricted in the  1950s. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan moved into 
synthetics. At the time, the United States basically outbargained Japan in bilateral negotiations for 
VERs to obtain rather restrictive numbers. Japan lost cotton market share to other Asian countries, 
especially Hong Kong. “Ironically, the VER accelerated the movement toward synthetics, which 
was indeed the most dynamic market segment” (Yoffie  1983, 63). In the 1960%  a similar trend 397  U.S. Political Pressure and Economic Liberalization in East Asia 
Asian  countries  successfully  pursued  long-run  gains  over  short-run  sacri- 
fices.6 
He also points out the Asian countries’  success was not matched by  the 
promotion of domestic industry by  the United States. The US. government 
lacked a coherent policy to protect or promote the domestic industry. Protected 
industries in the United States could not convert the short-run gains obtained 
by VERs and OMAs into long-run investment. The U.S. government tried but 
failed to revitalize industries already in trouble, focusing only on providing 
domestic makers with protection from imports, without measures to increase 
competitiveness. 
Another interpretation, a more cynical one, of the last aspect is that the US. 
government did not seriously intend to protect the domestic industry, in favor 
of  consumers’ interests and commitment to the free trade principle. Hence, 
the negotiations with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were more for 
politically appeasing than for helping (in the industrial policy sense) the do- 
mestic industry. If  this interpretation is correct, the outcome of  Asian coun- 
tries’ economic success is not surprising. (This interpretation is more likely to 
be the case in Republican administrations.) 
9.3  US.-Japan Bilateral Relations in the 1980s 
9.3.1  The New Type of U.S. Pressure and Japan’s “C~ncessions”~ 
As summarized above, U.S.-Japan trade conflicts have been commonplace 
since the late 1950s. Textiles, color TVs, and steel are famous cases of quotas 
and price controls from the late 1950s through the 1970s. The conflicts took a 
continued. The long-term agreement (LTA) was on “quantities of cotton textiles. An exporting 
country could increase export earnings by upgrading existing product lines and diversifying into 
synthetics. The irony behind the LTA was that it provided Japan, as well as other exporting nations, 
with an additional incentive to move into synthetics, which was fast becoming the most lucrative 
textile market” (Yoffie 1983, 105). 
Hong Kong was a different case. Its hard bargaining apparently defeated the U.S. attempt to 
restrict cotton exports in the late 1950s. The apparent short-run success had long-run costs. The 
United States had more severe restrictions under the STA and LTA  in the early 1960s, and Hong 
Kong fell behind in the movement toward synthetics (Yoffie  1983, 64-79,  110-13). “An ironic 
twist in Hong Kong’s success was that it did not move into synthetic textile fibers as quickly as 
Japan, Taiwan, or Korea” (I  12). 
The US. nonrubber footwear OMAs with Korea and Taiwan in  1977 resulted in upgrading 
Korean and Taiwanese footwear from low-price footwear into middle-price footwear, which was 
the only category in which the U.S. producers had a competitive advantage (Yoffie 1983, chap. 5). 
6. One of the mistakes Japan made, according to Yoffie’s evaluation, was the “textile wrangle” 
of 1969-7 1. Japan should have compromised earlier for better terms for an industry that was losing 
overall importance for Japan and competitiveness against other Asian countries. Japan “had no 
long-run future in the sector, yet it promoted confrontation for the sake of short-run gains. . . . 
Japan jeopardized the return of  Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, and only narrowly escaped pas- 
sage in the United States Congress of a highly restrictive trade bill.. . . While textiles may not 
have directly contributed to the Nixon ‘shocks’-the  overtures to China and the monetary declara- 
tions-they  played a major role in disrupting the alliance” (Yoffie 1983, 155). 
7. This section is partly based on Ito (1992, chap. 12). 398  Takatoshi It0 
different form in the 1980s. The Republican administration, with its philoso- 
phy of free trade, did not want to push protectionistic measures. Except for the 
first  four  years  of  the  automobile VER,  the  Reagan-Bush administration 
avoided attempts to limit imports from Japan (see below). Instead, much more 
effort was given to opening up Japanese markets.8  The 1980s were a decade of 
U.S. demand for market access, and sometimes a market share, in Japan. U.S. 
officials correctly argued that correction of trade imbalances by  increasing Ja- 
pan’s imports is far better than by limiting Japan’s exports to the United States. 
On the Japanese side, U.S. pressure was largely effective in persuading vested 
interest groups that obviously oppose less protection from imports, or in dis- 
mantling regulations that increase oligopolistic rents. This section summarizes 
the history of  the U.S.-Japan trade conflict before the 1980s, foreign pressure 
(  guiatsu) from the United States, and Japan’s response in liberalization (jiyuku) 
or  deregulation (kisei kunwa) of various markets in the 1980~~ 
9.3.2  The MOSS-SII Conflicts of the 1980s 
1. The yen-dollar group meeting of  1983-84  and follow-up meetings illus- 
trate essential features of the pattern of the United States’ demanding liberal- 
ization and Japan’s responding to it.’” The United States demanded, among 
other things, deregulation in Japan’s  domestic financial market. As a result, 
foreign trust banks entered the market; a direction, if not a schedule, of deregu- 
lation of deposit interest rates was decided; and Euroyen markets were deregu- 
lated. A rationale for the U.S.  demands was that to liberalize Japanese financial 
markets would invite foreign financial services into Japan, and foreign funds 
would be attracted to the Japanese stock and bond markets, thus putting pres- 
sure to appreciate the yen, the agreed objective at the time. However, as Frankel 
(1  984) forcefully argued, negotiated measures included steps to lower barriers 
for Japanese capital to flow abroad (that is, purchasing Treasury bonds), put- 
ting pressure to further appreciate the dollar, contrary to the stated objectives. 
Perhaps a posture of being tough was more important than substance;” or per- 
haps the Republican administration was just trying to export deregulation. 
8. This evaluation is in accordance with Destler (1991, 252): “There was, over the decade, a 
significant shift in policy emphasis. Both branches became much more aggressive in pressing for 
the opening of foreign markets.” 
9. There may be a subtle difference between liberalization and deregulation. Liberalization may 
include cases of interpreting and implementing regulations “liberally” so that market forces can 
work within the framework of  regulation. For example, the deposit interest rate for money market 
certificates in Japan is set by  a formula tied to the market rate. Deregulation usually refers to 
dismantling regulations completely. For example, the deposit interest rates on money market sav- 
ing and checking accounts in the United States have been deregulated since the beginning of  1983, 
as have large time deposits in Japan since 1985. 
10. See Frankel (1984) and Rosenbluth (1989, chap. 3) for background and detailed items of 
the yen-dollar working group negotiation. 
11. It is well publicized that the Japanese side was not particularly happy about American theat- 
rical toughness, such as Treasury Secretary Don Regan pounding a table to demand concessions 
from the Japanese. 399  U.S. Political Pressure and Economic Liberalization in East Asia 
2. Beef and orange (juice) imports into Japan were intensively negotiated 
from 1985 to 1987. According to the agreed-upon schedule, the import quota 
was raised in steps and was finally replaced by a tariff in 1991. The tariff rate 
for beef stood at 70 percent in April  1991 and was scheduled to decrease by 
10 percent each year for the next seven years. (It became 60 percent in April 
1992.) The switch from quota to tariff is significant. Under the quota system, 
a government agency (Chikusun Shinko Jigyodan) was the sole agency that 
could import beef, through the Japanese large trading houses. Although the 
quota was increased, no one could import directly from producers. The agency 
bought beef at the world price and "stabilized" the domestic price, that is, did 
not sell under a certain price. As a result, the agency accumulated beef and 
kept it literally frozen in the warehouse, instead of  lowering the domestic 
price.'* Since April 1991, wholesalers, trading houses, and large retail stores 
have  directly imported from foreign producers, with a 70 percent tariff. Al- 
though increased consumption of beef certainly improves the utility of an aver- 
age Japanese, a contribution to the trade balance is minimal. If every Japanese 
suddenly consumed twice as much beef and all the increase came from abroad, 
it would reduce Japan's  trade surpluses by  $2 billion." 
3. The construction business was targeted by  the USTR. The USTR has 
demanded  on  many  occasions  that  a  government  procurement procedure 
should be changed to allow bidding from foreign companies. The New Kansai 
Airport became a focus of attention. The design of a freight terminal and the 
construction of  a passenger  terminal were  won  by  a consortium including 
U.S. companies. 
Another aspect of the construction issue is bid rigging (dungo)  by construc- 
tion companies, which has long been suspected. It came under scrutiny when 
12. The Sumitomo 'Trading Company published a survey of various retail prices as of late July 
1990 (with conversion at 150 yeddollar). Beef (medium quality) cost 3,900 yen per kilogram in 
Tokyo, while comparable beef in New York cost 1,088 yen (that is, $3.25 per pound) (Toyo Keizai 
Srafisrics  Annual,  1991, 374). The Economic Planning Agency's  survey (in February  1990) put 
the beef (clod) price in Tokyo at 3,790 yen per kilogram, while it is 980 yen per kilogram in New 
York (Bank of Japan, Comparative  Economic and Financial Sfufisfics,  1991, 103). Yet  another 
survey by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (which has a conflict of interest in 
conducting a survey) showed the beef (clod) price at  1,300 yen per kilogram in New York, while 
it was  3,830 yen per kilogram in Tokyo in November 1990 at  145.83 yeddollar (Toyo Keizai 
Sraristics Annual, 1991, 258). 
The beef price seems to have come down in  1991, after retailers directly imported beef from 
the United States and other countries. On October 1991, a well-advertised sale at Ito-Yokado (a 
supermarket chain) priced a 250-gram steak from Nebraska at  1,OOO yen (about $13.85 per pound 
at 130 yeddollar), still about two to three times the U.S. retail price. Allowing for the 70 percent 
tariff, the beef price is judged to be converging to a reasonable range. 
13. The following estimating method was employed in  this statement. An  average employee 
household spent 32,675 yen on beef consumption in 1989. There were 3.72 persons per employee 
household. Since the Japanese retail price was about four times the U.S. retail price, the imported 
beef price would be as little as one-fiftb of the Japanese domestic price. This gives an estimate of 
1,756 yen  per person for beef at  an  import price of one-fifth of the Japanese retail price. The 
population in Japan was about 123 million in 1989. Hence, with 150 yeddollar, this translates into 
$1.4 billion for beef imports. 400  Takatoshi Ito 
the U.S. military base in Japan sued for damages and won a large settlement 
for construction work on the base. 
4. In 1985, negotiations between Japan and the United States started on the 
access of specific products to Japanese marketst4  The initial MOSS talks took 
up four products: electronic communication service and products, pharmaceu- 
ticals  and  medical  equipment,  electronics,  and  lumber  products.  For these 
products, the United States felt that U.S. firms had a competitive edge and that 
the Japanese markets were closed by  unnecessary regulations.  For example, 
the definition of “electronic communication products” included satellites, and 
of “electronics” included supercomputers. Procurement procedures of the Jap- 
anese government and its agencies for computers and satellites became a focus 
of  discussions resulting in an agreement  satisfactory to the United  States.I5 
Import procedures and license applications for pharmaceutical products have 
also been simplified, resulting in high marks from U.S. firms and trade organi- 
zations. 
Imports of satellites, service of cellular phones, and a license to trans-Pacific 
cables were negotiated from 1985 to 1987. Motorola applied to introduce cel- 
lular phones in Japan. The Japanese government divided Japan into half and 
gave the less-populated western half to Motorola’s joint venture and gave the 
eastern half, inclusive of  Tokyo, to NTT. After much protest  from Motorola 
and the USTR, the Japanese government finally gave a five-megahertz band in 
Tokyo to Motorola. 
The Japanese government has been developing satellites domestically. Un- 
der pressure from the U.S. government, it agreed to purchase US.-made satel- 
lites. When  two companies  applied for transpacific  cables,  the  Ministry  of 
Posts and Communications  decided  to allow only one company, possibly  a 
merged consortium. British Cable and Wire protested in vain in 1985. 
5. The large retail  store law in  1989 and  1990 came under attack in the 
SII talks.I6 The law itself, and ministry guidance in conjunction with the law, 
practically prohibited a large retail store from constructing a new branch with- 
out consent from the neighboring retail business.”  Hence, the law, which es- 
sentially  limits and discourages construction of department stores, discount 
stores, and large supermarkets, was heavily criticized by the United States dur- 
ing the SII. The United States contended that large stores carry more imported 
goods than do smaller stores; thus the law was an impediment to more imports. 
An application  of Toys “R’ Us became a symbol of the case. In 1990, MITI 
changed the procedure of the law, so that it became easy to open a large store. 
14. The MOSS talks started as a result of  the summit between Prime Minister Nakasone and 
15. In  1991, supercomputer procurements at Tohoku University and Kyoto University resulted 
16. For detail on the large retail store law and its impact on the Japanese distribution system, 
17. “Large retail store” is defined as any  retail store with 3,000 square meters or more in large 
President Reagan in January  1985. 
in sales of Clay computers, because NEC withheld a bid. 
see Ito (1992, chap. 13). 
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The law remained intact but was revised in 1991 to speed up the license exami- 
nation. The quantitative impact on trade balance is not known. What is certain 
is that Japanese consumers will benefit from more large retail stores with rea- 
sonably priced goods, and traditional corner-store owners are losers in the re- 
laxation of the law. The SII talks certainly tipped the scale in the debate. 
Other issues covered in the SII had implications, namely, to change the Japa- 
nese industry structures to allow more imports.’* 
6.  Rice imports to Japan have been banned. The reason given by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries is that a country has a right to “national 
security in food,” that is, to produce basic staples (kiso shokuryo) 100 percent 
domestically. Moreover, GATT has allowed the ban on imports for a food item 
that is under a domestic production quota. Dependence on imported “basic 
food” is considered dangerous.19  The Japanese Diet unanimously passed a res- 
olution opposing rice imports. 
The Rice Miller Association (RMA) twice brought the case to the USTR, 
on the basis of  article 301 of  the Omnibus Trade Act, and each time it was 
rejected. The second time it was rejected with a condition that rice imports to 
Japan would be discussed in the Uruguay Round. So far, the Uruguay Round 
has not produced a comprehensive agreement on agriculture in general. Japan 
is in no hurry for the talks to move toward agreement. 
From late 1990 to the spring of  1991, some leaders in the Liberal Demo- 
cratic party (LDP) floated the idea of an import quota, or minimum access, for 
rice. The idea was heavily criticized by the agricultural lobby in Japan, how- 
18. See Sheard (1991) for the viewpoint of industrial organization on the SII issue in general. 
19. A favorite example that illustrates the dangers of depending on imported food is the case of 
the U.S. soybean embargo in  1973 (and in the same line of reasoning, but less well known in 
Japan, the wheat embargo to the USSR after its invasion of Afghanistan). Japan heavily depended 
on  American  soybeans  for tofu  and  soy  sauce production  in  1971,  and  the  announcement 
shocked Japan. 
There are several problems with “national security in food” arguments, however. First, pro- 
cessed rice, for example, rice mixed with shrimp for pilaf, can be and has been imported. This 
may  be a logical inconsistency. Second, dependence on imports may be dangerous, but if  the 
sources are diversified, it is much less dangerous. The wheat embargo of  1979 against the USSR 
was not effective because the USSR could purchase wheat in the world market, in particular from 
Argentina. It is much more dangerous to be isolated in the world community. How could Japan 
function without oil, for example, even if rice is abundant? Third, by importing the goods, Japan 
can have a lobby in the United States, namely, U.S.  farmers will protest an export embargo, as 
they did the soybean embargo of 1971 and wheat embargo of  1979. The soybean embargo lasted 
for only three months. Fourth, suppose for the moment that it is dangerous to depend on food 
imports. How would the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries explain the rising trend 
in the import-dependency ratio for food other than rice? Japan depends on imports for most of  its 
grain and a large part of its fish. The import-dependency ratio based on calories is more than 60 
percent, among the highest in the OECD countries. Is it safe to have 100 percent self-sufficiency 
on rice alone? Strong national security should be based on efficient production, that is, minimizing 
costs, given consumption. (Rice consumption is considered to be price inelastic.) However, the 
production quota is decided, not by cutting off the least efficient producers, but by cutting across 
the board. Scale economies exist in farming but are not exploited in Japan. Driving up production 
costs, how could one argue the security benefits? (The cost argument is painfully familiar to the 
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ever, and by U.S. officials who insisted on a tariff instead of a quota.20  The rice 
farmers are very cautious, for beef and orange imports were liberalized despite 
the earlier pledge from LDP officials not to liberalize imports. The rice farmer 
learned that, if a partial import quota, or minimum access, is allowed, complete 
liberalization (zero tariff) will arrive sooner or later. 
The rice issue again is politically very sensitive in Japan, and consumers are 
unlikely to lobby for import liberalization. Corporations tend to favor mini- 
mum access because they fear some kind of retaliatory backlash in automobiles 
and semiconductors if rice ignites protectionism in the United States. Again, 
foreign pressure might be working, but it may take a while to settle the rice 
problem. 
9.3.3  Analysis and Evaluation 
Reviewing issues discussed between the United States and Japan (summa- 
rized in section 9.3.2), one might wonder how much of a dent these measures 
made in the (bilateral) trade balances. The expected small effect has always 
been questioned by  the Japanese in negotiations. The Japanese government 
maintained that the major cause of the US.-Japan trade imbalance rested on 
the large U.S. fiscal deficits and consumers’ impatience (spending instead of 
thriftiness).21  U.S. policymakers tended to respond either that these liberaliza- 
tion and deregulation measures are for the benefit of Japanese consumers or 
that deregulation and free trade should be defended as a matter of principle. 
More succinctly, many members of Congress and business leaders felt Japa- 
nese firms have unfair advantages in getting government help (subsidies) and 
protection  (nontariff  barriers  for foreigners).  Correcting  the  imbalance  re- 
quires prying open the Japanese markets. Moreover, the United States should 
push Japan, so that Japan becomes “more like us,” that is, run under perfect 
competition and free trade. 
In any case, the particular size of an expected correction for a single negoti- 
ated item was not the major concern. It may be that what was at stake was 
the principle of  less government intervention and free trade, the Republican 
economic agenda, rather than maximizing deficit reduction. 
A more likely explanation of the US.-Japan trade conflicts in the  1980s is 
that the White House used Japan as a scapegoat for domestic conflicts, while 
20. Many politicians and bureaucrats feel that the effective tariff rate that would minimize im- 
ports would be embarrassingly high, because Japan’s rice price is said to be eight times the world 
price. Japanese prefer short grain, however, and comparison may be difficult. The Forum for Policy 
Innovation (Seisaku Kohsoh Forum) estimated, taking into account transportation and warehouse 
costs, that a tariff of about 164 percent would make Kokuho Rose, a top-brand (short-grain) Cali- 
fornian rice, as expensive as the government sale price of  domestic rice, and of 269 percent would 
make Kokuho Rose as expensive as the top-brand Sakanishiki (Forum for Policy Innovation 1990). 
21. It can be easily shown from the GNP identity relationship that a trade deficit must result if 
domestic private saving is short of  domestic private investment and the government runs fiscal 
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Fig. 9.1  Conceptual framework of domestic and international conflicts 
the Japanese government in some quarters used foreign pressure to achieve an 
agenda of deregulation and to increase the slice of economic pie for consum- 
ers. In addition to the U.S.-Japan negotiations that take place officially, domes- 
tic negotiations and games are played within each country. In the United States, 
the White House and Congress often oppose each other, and in Japan, bureau- 
crats and politicians often argue over the issues. In each country, various politi- 
cal groups represent various producer and consumer groups, according to their 
political orientations and electoral needs.22 
Figure 9.1 shows a conceptual framework for this type of two-level game: 
first a struggle between  domestic players, bureaucrats versus politicians in 
Japan and White House versus Congress; then an international negotiation be- 
tween Japan and the United States. Domestic players represent consumers’ and 
special producers’ interests. What follows is a detailed elaboration of this hy- 
pothesis. 
The US.  Domestic Situation and Its Rejection in Trade Issues 
When a protectionist request is presented by  a special interest group, the 
U.S. government weights several economic and political trade-offs. In those 
calculations, arguments against protection come from domestic users of  im- 
ported products as well as from exporting countries’ government and con- 
sumer groups.23 
Another important ingredient of this scenario is that the United States was 
under a divided government for most of the 1980~.~~  The House, and the Senate 
22. See Weingast and Marshall (1988) for an attempt to analyze legislatures (Congress) in an 
industrial organization framework. See McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987) for how adminis- 
trative procedures, such as rules of who bears the burden of proof, could be used politically. Hill- 
man and Ursprung (1988) show that trade policy can be understood as a tool for gaining domestic 
political support. A VER is used to please a specific interest group, while tariffs may be divisive, 
so that no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a VER 
is a policy option. 
23. See Destler and Ode11 (1987) for an analysis of domestic antiprotection activities. 
24. Divided government has become more common in American political history, according to 
Alesina and Carliner (1991). It may be “the result of a conscious attempt by  the voters to achieve 
moderate policy. . . .  Voters in the middle of the political spectrum desire policies in between those 
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also after 1986, wanted to criticize the administration for its lack of trade pol- 
icy.2s  On the other side, the executive office tried to deflect protectionist pres- 
sure and, sometimes, to steal the opportunity to initiate pressures on  other 
countries, in order to score points domestically. The executive office may be 
unenthusiastic in obtaining protectionistic concessions from other countries, 
but is certainly not reluctant to press for opening markets for U.S. goods. In 
order to preempt a criticism from Congress, the White House wanted to appear 
tough on Japan. 
One of  the obvious issues in the 1980s was trade deficits. Over 30 percent 
of trade deficits were against Japan. Hence, Japan was chosen as an instrument 
for congressional criticism of the administration. This instrument is quite use- 
ful and effective, because the Japanese economy seems to behave differently 
than other economies. 
Traditionally, Republicans advocated smaller government and fewer regula- 
tions, compared to the Democrats. The administration’s stated goal was  to 
make trade free and to let the market determine the outcome. Hence, whenever 
Congress threatened to pass protectionistic bills and to promote imports and 
put surcharges on imports, the Republican administration tried to focus on the 
issue of opening the Japanese market. A tough posture was maintained by  the 
administration in order to outdo Congress. The Republican administration was 
interested in scoring domestically by criticizing Japan rather than by reducing 
the deficit, although the latter was always a pretext for negotiation. The admin- 
istration was willing to take up issues that fit the Japanese agenda, so long as 
they also fit the Republican agenda. In that sense, Japan was a scapegoat, but 
a fortunate one: the scapegoat was not for sacrifice, but for window dressing. 
Of  course, U.S.-Japan conflicts have a long history (as shown in table 9.2) 
and occur even in the period without a divided government. During the last 
twelve years when divided government prevailed, the conflicts developed a 
distinctive MOSS-SII feature. MOSS-SII negotiations attempted to open Japa- 
nese markets instead of closing the American market, in order to remedy the 
trade imbalance. This fit the Republican White House agenda and acted to 
counter congressional pressure. By using MOSS-SII negotiations, the Republi- 
can administration took an initiative in domestic politics on the international 
trade front. 
Hence, it is fair to say that the divided government in the 1980s likely ex- 
plains the Republican administration’s adoption of  MOSS-SII  demands on 
Japan, as opposed to the traditional VER type (which is more of a Democratic 
party approach). 
However, it also spawned congressional counterattacks using the results- 
oriented pressure, because the MOSS-SII negotiations were seen as insuffi- 
25. It is not important in this context whether Congress is truly interested in protectionist mea- 
sures, as often charged by the conservative press and the Republicans,  or is interested in appearing 
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cient to remedy the imbalance in merchandize trade with Japan. The new ap- 
proach also is employed to seize the initiative in domestic politics from the 
White House.26 
The Japanese Domestic Situation and Its Rejection on Trade Issues 
The Japanese economic and political system has produced remarkable eco- 
nomic development and progress. Elements that produced 10+ percent high- 
speed economic growth (kodo sei~ho)~~  included high saving rate, high fixed 
investment rate, export subsidies, and import restriction. Even after the first oil 
crisis, the Japanese economy overcame two oil crises and the yen-appreciation 
recessions (1978 and 1986) to maintain 5 percent growth rates. During all these 
years, what occupied the minds of Japanese business leaders, political leaders, 
and bureaucrats was how to cut costs, how to earn foreign currencies (dollar), 
how to improve quality of goods, and how to produce goods better. Economic 
growth, with the balance of payments constraint, was the “principle” used to 
evaluate funding and political priority. If cost-benefit analyses for exports and 
growth did not justify projects, they were not funded. 
Of  course, political priorities have shifted from agriculture to heavy indus- 
trial products and to high-technology products. Unfortunately, when an entire 
process is geared toward production as opposed to consumption, it is difficult 
to switch priorities. 
In fact, Japan has not seriously switched its economic goal for more than 
forty years. The political process added objectives but did not switch objec- 
tives. Shifting weights among priorities was not a hard choice, when the entire 
pie, to be sliced and distributed among participants, was inflating at 10 percent 
per annum.28  This is partly because severe political resistance arises when the 
26. If this working hypothesis is correct, dissolving a divided government by electing a Demo- 
cratic  president  would make  the  U.S.-Japan  conflict less confrontational  (less use  of  results- 
oriented pressure), hence more productive for the U.S.-Japan relationship. This contradicts a popu- 
lar notion in Japan that a Democratic president would be a protectionist and a disaster for Japan. 
27. The era of high-speed economic growth is defined as 1955-73,  when real GNP grew on 
average at more than 10 percent a year, doubling income every seven years. See Kosai (1986). 
28. Of course, some items are rigid even in their share, instead of the budget amount. The shares 
among different uses (ministry turf) of public works in the national general budget was surpris- 
ingly stable. For example, see Sakakibara (1990, 87): 
Public works budget share 
1979  1987 
Agriculture infrastructure  14.11  14.13 
Irrigation  13.55  13.72 
Road  30.77  28.92 
Sewerage  10.71  10.91 
Forestry  4.53  4.56 
Fishery  2.87  2.95 
Seaport infrastructure  4.20  4.17 
Housing  11.25  12.44 406  Takatoshi It0 
absolute value of the budget declines, and partly because the Japanese electoral 
system favors vested interest groups. The downward rigidity of the budget may 
be not a result of “rational choice,” but a reality.29 
Under  slow growth, it is much  more difficult  to add a new  agenda  (say, 
sewerage, city parks and playgrounds, or even airports), because it means cut- 
ting  a stale agenda (say, irrigation  or seaports for commercial  fishing).  But 
when “better quality of life” has clearly overtaken “more exports” as the na- 
tional priority, why does a new agenda not arise? 
Who steers the ship in Japan? How  is the  social consensus on priorities 
determined? This may be a mystery. There is no clear leadership. Important 
policy items seem to be decided behind closed doors. Politicians cannot ignore 
business lobbyists; business leaders are subject to ministry guidance; and bu- 
reaucrats seem to be influenced by politicians’ needs.30  No one seems to be in 
charge, but somehow a group of powerful players form a consensus. 
It was clear by the mid- 1980s that the traditional value of maximum growth 
did not fit contemporary Japan. Foreign countries, the United States and Eu- 
rope alike, criticize Japan for working  too hard  and exporting too much.3i 
American and European economists, as well as government officials, argued 
that if Japan invested more on infrastructure for improved life, such as parks, 
sewerage, roads and sidewalks, and public transportation, then it would  in- 
crease the standard of living, or quality of life, Domestic demand expansion 
would reduce exports to foreign countries, reducing trade conflicts. The current 
account surplus/GNP ration exceeded 4 percent in 1986, which was not sus- 
tainable from the international political point of view. 
The difficulty in shifting political  priorities in Japan has two main causes 
However, other means of budget allocation, especially through the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Program (FILP), have changed their priorities. See Ito (1992, chap. 6). 
29. Myopic or uninformed voters may justify this. Supposc that farmers would not resist if the 
subsidies or public work budget (after inflation adjustment) did not decline, while the agricultural 
share in the budget did. 
30. This nontransitive relationship among politicians, bureaucrats, and business is commonly 
nicknamed in Japan the “stone, paper, scissors” (jankenpon)  structure. It is also known as a “trun- 
cated pyramid’ (van Wolferen 1989,5):  “Today, the most powerful groups include certain ministry 
officials,  some political cliques and clusters of bureaucrat-businessmen. . . .  There is, to be sure, a 
hierarchy or, rather,  a complex of overlapping hierarchies. But it has no peak: it is a truncated 
pyramid.” See Sakakibara (1990.71 =X8)  for the way the Ministry of Finance and the ruling party 
have to negotiate the budget. 
31. In  1985, the average number of working hours for manufxturing production workers in 
Japan was 43.2 hours per week, while it was 38.3 hours per week in the United States. 
Japan  U.S.  U.K.  Germany  France 
1985  43.2  38.3  41.8  42.0  38.6 
1990  42.3  38.2  41.6  40.7  38.8 
Source: Bank of Japan, Comparative Economic and Fi~zancial  Statistics (1991, 109, I1  I). 
Notes: Japan in 1985 and 1990 has a discontinuity in statistical method. Germany (West) in  1990 
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connected to the electoral system. First, the House of Representatives electoral 
system, that is, the single nontransferable vote, multimember district system, 
makes interest groups very important. The ruling LDP candidates in the same 
district usually divide their support bases through trade groups. (Another way 
is to divide their support bases by subdistricts.) For example, votes are strongly 
tied to small and medium-sized shops in commercial districts, to the construc- 
tion industry, and to farmers.32 
Second, it is well known that apportionment  .is seriously behind reality in 
Japan. In an extreme case, the number of registered voters per representative 
in a rural district is about one-third of  that in a metropolitan area. Political 
interests of the agricultural and fishery businesses are overrepresented in the 
House of Representatives. 
“Quality of life giant” (seikutsu tuikoku) became a code phrase of the Miya- 
zawa cabinet for changing a national priority away from investment toward 
consumption, and away from exports toward infrastructure for a better standard 
of living. Indeed, a desire among the Japanese for higher satisfaction with life 
grew rapidly in the second half of the 1980s, because the citizens, as portrayed 
in the mass media, started to realize the gap between the standard of living, 
especially the poor quality of housing, and macroeconomic strength, such as 
Japan’s new  status as the world’s largest creditor. The Maekawa report (April 
1986) clearly stated that one of the national priorities is improving the quality 
of life. 
However, concrete steps toward better life have come very slowly. There 
were two kinds of problems. First, it was difficult to divert resources from, say, 
agricultural infrastructure to that related to quality of  life, especially under 
relatively slow growth. This pitted farmers against a silent mass of consumers. 
Second, increasing consumers’ welfare often involves deregulation, while Jap- 
anese government officials and business leaders tend to rely on a plan and 
coordination between business and the g~vernment.’~ 
A big push from influential foreign countries was much needed in the mid- 
1980s. Foreign pressure (gaiutsu) is most effective when it funds a big, though 
silent, constituency in Japan. Successful liberalization, as for beef and oranges, 
and deposit interest rates fit into this pattern. Japan used foreign pressure to 
take steps toward a new national priority, better quality of life. 
There are two reasons why the MOSS-SII pressure of the 1980s has worked 
in Japan. First, the U.S. list of demands was in accordance with the new em- 
phasis on better quality of life (increasing consumers’ surplus, instead of pro- 
32. The importance of the electoral system in making political decisions in Japan was mentioned 
and emphasized by  my discussant, Frances Rosenbluth, at  the conference. This paragraph was 
added to incorporate her comments. 
33. The concept of “excess competition” (kato kyoso), which is analogous to  destructive, cut- 
throat competition, is used as a rationale for regulation in Japan. Many government officials and 
business leaders think perfect competition, or laissez-faire,  does not necessarily  optimize social re- 
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ducers’ surplus); second, those who lose vested interests or oligopolistic rents 
in the wake of liberalization had a political and psychological bias in favor of 
the United States. They felt that if the U.S. government wanted liberalization, 
they could give in (shoganai). 
Those who suffer from regulatory changes are traditional supporters of the 
LDP and friends of the United States: they feel grateful to the United States 
for successful help, during the occupation period and later, in various eco- 
nomic and political areas. With U.S. pressure, Japan could achieve liberaliza- 
tion that accords with a shift in priority at minimal political cost. 
In summary, giving in to US. demands was a face-saving excuse that could 
be used by  bureaucrats to politicians, and by  politicians to voters. Leaders in 
big business did not bark at deregulation because they were afraid of  being 
squeezed out of the U.S. market in retaliation. 
U.S. pressure (the MOSS-SII type) and liberalization benefited Japanese 
consumers most. To a lesser extent, U.S. firms and Japanese new entrants re- 
ceived benefits. Losers were mainly those who had been protected by regula- 
tion. Politically, both the U.S. government and the Japanese government used 
foreign pressure for their benefit: the United States used it as a scapegoat for 
the inability to manage the size of fiscal and trade deficits, while the Japanese 
used it to minimize political damage caused by deregulation and liberalization. 
9.3.4  Signs of a Dangerous Current: Unilateralism and Resentment 
U.S. Unilateralism 
A turning point for U.S. frustration came in  1985, after the administration 
lost its grip on Congress (see Destler 1986, appendix). In the spring of  1985, 
the Senate passed, 92-0,  a resolution condemning Japan as an unfair trading 
partner. In September 1986, a semiconductor agreement was signed by  the 
U.S. and the Japanese governments, only to result in a U.S. finding of Japan’s 
violating the agreement in  1987. The Congress finalIy passed the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of  1988 with the super 301 clause. 
Let us call this kind of  approach U.S. unilateralism: (I) the issue (or the 
product) is singled out without  being  considered in  a broader framework; 
(2) the United States unilaterally determines whether a trading partner is en- 
gaged in unfair trade (dumping, market closed to American products); and 
(3) the United States unilaterally imposes retaliatory fines (or tariffs) if it deter- 
mines that the country violates a United States-imposed rule. The super 301 is 
a perfect example of U.S. ~nilateralism.~~ 
U.S. frustration was compounded by a series of MITI mistakes and miscal- 
culations. In the spring of  1985, President Reagan announced that he would 
not seek the continuation of  the automobile VER. MITI, however, opted to 
continue the VER with a higher ceiling.35  The ceiling was increased from 1.85 
34. See Bhagwati and Patrick (1990) for discussions among economists in the United States. 
35. See Ito (1992, 381-82,  n.4) for a detailed account of  this episode. 409  U.S.  Political Pressure and Economic Liberalization in East Asia 
million cars to 2.3 million cars. This infuriated the president and Congress. 
Reagan denounced the decision because he had not asked for another VER, 
and the Congress was upset because of the 24 percent increase in the number 
of  exports. Congressional frustration contributed to the passage in March of 
the resolution denouncing Japan. Faced with U.S. criticism, Prime Minister 
Nakasone admitted that MITI’s decision to increase the number was a mistake. 
MITI also miscalculated the significance of the semiconductor agreement in 
July 1986. MITI thought that signing the agreement would alleviate pressures 
for  Japanese  purchase  of  American-made  semiconductors.  However,  the 
United States found that Japan violated the agreement on two counts in March 
1987, transshipping with a lower price through Hong Kong and failure to in- 
crease imports to Japan (Prestowitz 1988,61-70). The MITI miscalculated the 
seriousness of the United States about the market share target (or commitment) 
in the agreement. 
Hence, the second half of the 1980s was characterized by a mix of two types 
of  conflicts, market access such as SII, and U.S. unilateralism such as super 
301 and the semiconductor agreement. 
Revisionist Znfiuence 
The so-called revisionists argue that Japan operates in a different economic 
system. Since the Japanese economy is different, different rules should be ap- 
plied. For example, in order to open the Japanese market, normal negotiation 
is inadequate, because even if  one barrier to imports (say, quota) is removed, 
another problem (say, procurement procedure and keiretsu trading) emerges to 
keep imports out. Hence, the most effective measure against Japan is to have 
it commit to a concrete number, such as the market share in Japan, and have it 
figure out how to carry out the commitment. 
Revisionists think that in traditional trade negotiations, the Japanese bureau- 
crats outmaneuvered the American counterparts through delaying tactics and 
by not understanding the spirit of an agreement. The Japanese took advantage 
of a Republican government that promoted free trade, by exporting more to the 
United States while not lowering import barriers. Some go on to argue that 
Japanese manufacturers engage in “adversarial exports,” maximizing the mar- 
ket share by exporting products without imp~rting.~~ 
Revisionists emphasize Japan’s  preference for in-group trading,  such as 
keiretsu trading, as a source of  low import ratio. The rules of  the game are 
different in Japan: keiretsu trade, low capital costs (due to high saving rate and 
a capital market closed to foreign firms), long working hours, low wage, low- 
quality social infrastructure (such as sewerage), and low quality of housing. 
Essentially, the Japanese firms can take advantage of these characteristics to 
enhance international competitiveness. 
36. See Drucker (1986). A similar line of argument, considering Japan  as “Japan, Inc.,” a big, 
social, conspiratory entity, is common from Prestowitz to Cresson. However, this kind of conspira- 
tory argument would not stand up to a close scrutiny of  the  Japanese political and economic sys- 
tem. See Krugman (1990, 120) for a similar assessment. 410  Takatoshi It0 
There are possibly three arguments that, I think, could barely justify the 
revisionist policy recommendation (from the U.S. point of view), which essen- 
tially advocates an expanded import commitment (quota) for Japan. I discuss 
the arguments and then the Japanese reactions to them. 
First, some policymakers and critics in the United States, who emphasize 
domestic interests (America first), finally realize that traditional types of pres- 
sure (that is, VERs and OMAs) give oligopoly rents to foreign producers as 
well as to domestic producers. The new market-access types (SII) mainly en- 
hance the Japanese consumers’ welfare, with little gain to the U.S. producers. 
Hence, the “fruits” did not come from political shows of beating Japan using 
the traditional or the new type of pressure. It is now time to seek U.S. interests 
aggressively. (Recall table 9.1  .) The revisionist side, of course, would not pre- 
sent the argument this way.  (However, implications are clear from what they 
advocate, that is, “import this much or retaliate.”) They argue that the Japanese 
are restricting imports by broadly defined nontariff barriers. An extraordinary 
low ratio of manufactures imports proves the point, and no further pinpointing 
of the problem is necessary, according to  revisionist^.^^ 
Second, a more sophisticated theory could be used to justify the market 
access negotiations. New  trade theory states that pursuing the market share 
may pay off in the long run, if the market for the product expands in the future. 
In  the same logic, export subsidies may  be justified as a strategy. The new 
theory possibly justifies industrial policy and infant industry protection. When 
there are scale economies in technology, it is important to get the market share 
first, by  securing the domestic market by protection or by expanding into for- 
eign markets by subsidies or by thin margins (if not by dumping). Revisionists 
in this vein regret that the United States allowed Japan’s infant industry protec- 
tion for automobiles, shipbuilding, and other products that later dominated the 
world market. They also believe that the best chance for the United States 
would be to aggressively promote industries with a competitive, technological 
edge in the 1990s. This is managed trade, but it is better than free trade.3x  The 
best chance for the United States is to pry open the Japanese market, denying 
MITI’s infant industry protection. Products in this category include satellites, 
aircraft, supercomputers, some types of chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. 
Third, the logic of  affirmative action, which is an application of  Spence’s 
signaling theory, may justify a line of revisionist argument. Suppose that, what- 
ever the reason, American products are perceived to be of inferior quality. Con- 
sumers would not buy American commodities (say, automobiles) if their prices 
37. See Dornbusch (1990) for this kind of argument: “Japan actively participated in the GATT 
tariff-cutting rounds but avoided opening its market through keeping in place a second layer of 
trade restriction” (Dornbusch 1990, 108).  “Japan seems to be somewhat of an onion with multiple 
layers of protection of one kind or  another” (Dornbusch 1990, 120). Dornbusch does on to cite a 
low “intra-industry” trade index for Japan as an  evidence of closed Japanese  market. However, 
Dornbusch himself points out that the number is consistent if the Japanese consumer has a “prefer- 
ence” for the Japanese goods (buy Japanese) without formal import barrier. You cannot blame pref- 
erence. 
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are similar to those of comparable Japanese commodities. This is discrimina- 
tion by the origin of manufacturing. American producers would not make ef- 
forts (investment and concentration) to make high-quality goods, because ef- 
forts would not pay  off. The result would be that American products are of 
inferior quality. Hence, this is the case of self-fulfilling perceptions. The Amer- 
ican commodities are trapped in a low-reputation equilibrium. If the percep- 
tion changes, Americans would respond by changing the quality, moving to a 
high-quality equilibrium. This kind of multiple equilibrium justifies the use of 
quotas both  in affirmative action of  racial preferences and in  international 
trade. 
Japan’s Resentment 
Japanese reactions to U.S. pressure have  changed gradually through the 
1980s. To traditional U.S. pressure say, the automobile VER, the reaction was 
like making a deal with a bully. Although it was not optimal to “concede” to a 
U.S. demand, it was not a “resentment.” For MOSS-SII pressure, the Japanese 
reaction was mixed. One group of Japanese thought that SII pressure was inter- 
ference in internal affairs, while another group welcomed it as foreign pres- 
sure, which improves the welfare of the Japanese consumers. However, there 
is little sympathy in Japan for the super 301 pressure. It is clear that more 
people were offended by  SII pressure than by  VER pressure; and still more 
people were offended by super 301 pressure than by SII. The United States is 
losing its  friends  and  constituents in  Japan  very  quickly  with  super  301 
pressure. 
Japan’s resentment at result-oriented demands is threefold. First, the Japa- 
nese, especially business leaders, tend to think that they earned their competi- 
tiveness by hard work and endless innovations. The Japanese saved a lot of 
household income and reinvested saving into machines, structures, and R&D. 
As a result, Japanese products have become better and have won a high market 
share in the United States and in the world. That is nothing to be ashamed of. 
In fact, Japanese products have overcome a reputation, or “signaling,” problem, 
described as a possible justification of  the revisionist argument.39  Moreover, 
automobile and consumer electronics industries were not actively helped by 
government industrial policies: no export subsidy, no low-interest  rate loan 
programs, and no depression cartels to allow oligopoly rent.40  Meanwhile, the 
United States consumed a lot and failed to save. It is a US. management prob- 
lem that U.S. manufacturers could not keep up with technological innovations 
by  investment, the Japanese argue.4L  As for the current account imbalance in 
39. It took more than ten years after its first export attempt for Toyota to make a successful entry 
into a U.S. market. 
40. In the 1960s. the automobile  industry fought off the MITI attempt to  merge several automak- 
ers into two or three, and to restrict a passenger model to a particular type, “Folkscar,” (kokurnin- 
sha).  See Yakushiji (1984) for this episode. 
41. At this point, many Japanese recite a well-known Aesop fable, “The Ant and the Grass- 
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the 1980s, many economists point out that it was mainly caused by U.S. fis- 
cal deficits. 
Second, many Japanese resent most unilateralism, that is, the United States 
telling Japan “import this much or we retaliate.” This treats Japan not like an 
important ally of the Western world, but almost like an enemy. In fact, a retalia- 
tory measure was taken after the United States found Japan guilty of violating 
the semiconductor agreement. An implicit agreement, believed by MITI, dur- 
ing the market access negotiations was that Japan should suggest topics fit to 
talk about, while the United States took opportunities to pretend to be tough 
on Japan. Hence, real bashing, or retaliation with teeth, was seen as violating 
the rules of the game. The super 301 was also intensely disliked by the Japa- 
nese, because it did not enhance Japanese consumers’ welfare, and it appeared 
much more unfair to the Japanese because the United States played both prose- 
cutor and judge. 
Third, some Japanese feel that Japan is singled out as a villain (not just a 
scapegoat). For example, when Fujitsu had to stop its take-over of a Califor- 
nian semiconductor company that is owned by a French firm because of oppo- 
sition from the US.  government on national security grounds, many Japanese 
felt that they were not regarded as a friendly nation. Similar resentment was 
registered when U.S. pressure halted a Japanese plan to develop its own design 
for the next generation.of the Japanese fighter jet, FSX.42 
Morita and Ishihara (1989) were the first among influential Japanese who 
recorded the resentment in a dramatic way. They advocated that Japan say no 
to U.S. pressure. Morita’s and Ishihara’s work got high praise from those who 
did not see that U.S. pressures  of  the MOSS-SII type worked for Japanese 
consumers and became increasingly imtated by U.S. “interference in internal 
affairs” of Japan. 
The Gulf War 
The Gulf War tested the relationship between the United States and Japan. 
Many Americans were predictably upset with countries, such as Germany and 
Japan, that did not help fight Iraq. 
The Japanese government, on the one hand, explained that the constitution 
prohibits the self-defense force to go abroad to engage in fighting; on the other 
hand, it unsuccessfully tried to send some personnel as a support (nonfight- 
ing) team. 
A new word was created in Japan to express this feeling: Ken-bei, or “dislike 
the United States.”43  This is different from the anti-United  States feeling that 
42. With pressure from the United States, the United States and Japan decided to develop jointly 
the new fighter jet in October 1987. In November 1988, the two countries signed an agreement for 
a joint development, with Japan paying for the entire development cost, $165 billion. In  1989, 
however, Congress pushed for a revision of  the plan in order to minimize technological transfer 
to Japan. 
43. Ken (with a particular Chinese character) means to “dislike,” or “disapprove,” but it could 
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is typically expressed by  the socialists and the communists. Ken-bei people 
may be quite knowledgeable about the United States. Yet they are either disil- 
lusioned by  the United States’ being unable to solve domestic problems- 
crimes, drugs, homelessness, education, twin deficits, S&Ls, and so forth-or 
frightened and alienated by  a seemingly trigger-happy attitude against Iraq. 
Many Japanese observers took the January  15 deadline as a bluff; few pre- 
dicted an immediate attack. Even after the success of the attack, many Japanese 
did not approve of the attack, for pacifist reasons.& 
A fiasco over contribution to the Gulf War chest from Japan did not help 
sentiments in both  ~0untries.j~  The same pattern was repeated. The United 
States asked for action (in this case, monetary contribution), and Japan delayed 
a decision. When Japan decided to contribute $9 billion, in addition to $4 bil- 
lion pledged earlier, it was considered to be too late. Then the Japanese side 
felt that Japan’s contribution was not appreciated enough. Moreover, currency 
depreciation made actual payments short of $9 billion. Apparently, the finance 
minister pledged in the dollar denomination, while the budget was made in 
After a protest from the United States, Japan made up the difference, 
with a lot of reluctance. 
9.4  U.S. Pressure and Regional Implications 
relationships among nations in the Pacific region. 
9.4.1 
Will U.S.-Japan conflicts make Japan turn to the East Asian countries, possi- 
bly as a market or as a diverted export base? There have been strong economic 
relations between Japan and the East Asian nations. It has been established 
that Asian countries provide high-quality labor for assembly and component 
production. They have become an important production base for U.S. as well 
as Japanese companies. 
Although Asia has not reached the point of replacing North America as a 
market for Japan, its importance as a market has grown substantially. During 
the first half of the 1980s, China looked like a new frontier for Japanese ex- 
ports, but the export amount decreased substantially during the second half. 
Instead, the Asian NIES and other ASEAN countries became important mar- 
This section examines what kind of implications US. pressure has for the 
The U.S.-Japan Conflict and Japan’s Attitude toward Asia 
United States. The ken-bei became popular in 1990-91. In 1992, another word was created, en- 
bei (avoid or despise the United States), and a most recently created word is bu-bei (contempt of 
the United States). 
44. These pacifists ignored the fact that the United States carefully crafted the consensus in the 
United Nations, to which Japan has always pledged strong support. In fact, Japan’s diplomacy is 
said to give most weight to the United Nations. 
45. See Inoguchi (1991) for analysis of Japan’s response to the Gulf crisis. 
46. News of the United States’ asking Japan to make up the exchange rate loss contributed to 
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kets for Japan. In  1990, the United States and Canada combined absorbed 
about $100 billion (up from $70 billion in 1985) of Japanese goods, while East 
Asian countries absorbed about $80 billion (up from $30 billion in  1985).  See 
table 9.3 for details. 
The pattern has been that Asian countries run trade deficits against Japan 
while exporting final goods to the United States to keep net trade surpluses 
(table 9.3). Typically, Asian NIES import technology and parts from Japan and 
manufacture reasonably priced consumer electronics goods and automobiles 
for export to the United States, but not to Japan. For Asian NIES, Japan was a 
good source of parts, but not a good customer. In 1981, Asian NIES imported 
about $8  1 billion from Japan and exported only $9 billion to Japan, and eight 
to one ratio. In 1990, however, Asian NIES imported $57 billion from Japan, 
while they exported $26 billion to it, a close to two to one ratio. The gap is still 
large, and even if the trend continues, it would take another decade or more, 
until the Asian NIES-Japan  trade balance would break even. 
Table 9.3  Exports and Imports of  Japan, by Region (in millions of dollars) 























Export from Japan 
38,609  65,278 
3,399  4,520 
20,841  22,493 
2,251  2,030 
2,424  2,168 
1,928  937 
4,113  2,172 
23,748  25,199 
5,095  12,477 
3,259  2,750 
152,030  175,638 
Import into Japan 
25,297  25,793 
4,464  4,773 
8,524  9,838 
1,061  1,027 
2,927  4,330 
1.73  1  1,243 
13,305  10,119 
11,541  12,356 
5,292  6,483 
2,020  1,429 























Source:  Ministry  of  Finance,  Customs Bureau,  cited  in  Toyo Keizai Starisrics Annual (1991, 
23 1-32). 
Note: Based on customs figures. NIES = Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore. 415  U.S. Political Pressure and Economic Liberalization in East Asia 
Since much of Japanese exports to Asian countries have been components 
and parts that are used for goods destined for the United States, one might 
suspect the U.S.-Japan conflict would cause Japanese companies to set up a 
diverted base of exports from Asian countries. It is difficult to speculate how 
much of  Asian exports to the United States are by  subsidiaries of  Japanese 
companies. Much of  the  increase in Korean  and Taiwanese exports to the 
United  States comes from their own companies, though parts might come 
from Japan. 
Worsening of the U.S.-Japan relationship at this point would not promote 
more intraregional trade, for two reasons. First, such a conflict would likely 
spill over to other Asian countries. The United States became extremely cau- 
tious toward Asian NIES, for fear of a repetition of  the success of  Japanese 
penetration into the United States. The United States has been tough on Korean 
trade surpluses against the United States, considering that Korea only recently 
paid back foreign debts. Second, the size of markets for final products such as 
automobiles is  still small in Asia. Unless China with  its large population 
changes its regime and continues to grow quickly, or the CIS turns to Asia for 
trade relations, markets are simply not present. (There is a limit how many cars 
and VCRs one family wants. Population is an important factor.) 
However, if the political integration of the European Community results in 
an  economic  fortress  and  if  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement 
(NAFTA) becomes a reality, the Asian nations may have no choice but to unite 
as a regional trading bloc:’ 
In summary, the trend shows signs of Japan’s becoming mature enough to 
absorb Asian goods, and Asian nations’ becoming mature enough to export to 
Japan. But it is too soon to expect intraregional trade to dominate U.S. trade 
with Asian countries (including Japan). The heightened tension between Japan 
and the United States would be counterproductive at this point for regional 
trade and relationship. The Pacific Asian intraregional trade is not an alterna- 
tive to Asian-North  American trade, unless North American and European 
markets become closed against Asian 
9.4.2  U.S. Pressures on Asian Countries 
As explained in section 9.4.1, U.S. traditional and SII pressures on Japan 
have worked (or worked until recently) because of Japan’s domestic political 
situation. That is, those who had vested interests to be lost in liberalization are 
those who sided with the LDP and the United States in its ideology. Moreover, 
47. Such a regional trading bloc was first proposed by Prime Minister Makathir of Malaysia in 
1990 by the  name of  East Asian economic  grouping (EAEG), including Japan,  Korea, China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and the ASEAN-Six (Singapore, Thailand, Burnei, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia). The United States insisted that it be included in the bloc. With U.S. 
pressure, Japan  is hesitant to commit to the EAEG plan. 
48. This assessment should not give the United States a free hand to put more pressure on Japan 
and other Asian countries. The strain from pressure is already too much, so that resentment might 
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internal pressure was already mounting for a better life. U.S. pressure only 
tipped the balance. 
As explained in section 9.2, similar pressures have been applied to Korea, 
Taiwan, and other Asian nati0ns.4~  However, the impacts of U.S. protectionistic 
measures are more serious on Korea and Taiwan than on Japan, because of 
their relatively  lower GNP  and  relatively  higher dependence on  the  U.S. 
market. 
There is a strong tradition in economic policy and economic management, 
that government planning and regulation would be good for economic growth. 
Government intervention for infant industry protection (and more generally, 
for progress from import substitution to export substitution) is considered to 
be desirable. Until the economy becomes mature, government is unlikely to 
give up economic planning to maximize growth. 
In summary, US. pressure for liberalization would not work unless the re- 
ceptive environment is already there. The time is too soon. 
9.4.3 
Political Aspects 
A stable U.S.-Japan political relationship is no less important than export- 
import ties. Many Japanese and Asians feel that Japan has  not apologized 
enough for its behavior before the Second World War. Unless Japan as a nation 
is accepted by its Asian neighbors, the United States is needed as a countervail- 
ing power. However, feelings toward Japan vary among the Asian nations. 
Lack of Principles in Japan 
It is extremely difficult to read the positions of leaders in various Japanese 
groups and parties. It  is rare to see potential leaders compete for a top post 
with principles and positions. It is rare that different projects and ideas are 
evaluated in public, with different executives taking positions. 
Is it culture? Or does it derive from an economic structure? The Japanese 
are known for their group orientation and consensus building. Japanese stu- 
dents and office workers are trained not to express opinions and not to debate 
with logic over different positions in public. A durable leader in a Japanese 
hierarchy is the one who does not reveal his position (in extremely rare cases, 
her position), having subordinates and colleagues debate and fight over posi- 
tions, and having them turn to him for a decision that prevails as a “consensus” 
of the group. Minority opinions should not be revealed once the group makes 
the decision. Since it is a consensus, the leader does not have to take the blame 
even if  the project fails, at least from internal pressure. Leadership may  be 
lethal because it comes with conflicts. Is this a unique culture? Perhaps. Educa- 
tion contributes heavily to homogeneous thinking. 
Problems of Japan’s Relationship with Asia 
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The Japanese hierarchy in big corporations, government, academics, and po- 
litical parties is extremely rigid in promotion. It goes by  age.50  Unless one 
goes to a top post, a good retirement is not guaranteed. Hence, people become 
extremely cautious in taking sides and expressing opinions in public. There is 
no fast track, so group discipline works.51 
Assertiveness 
Taking positions and debating over ideology were much more common in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Labor-management conflicts and left-right political con- 
flicts were common. However, as the fruits of high-speed growth trickled down 
to all participants of  the society, different agents seem to have engaged in a 
truce. The turf is defined, and they agree to fix the border. 
To take just one example, the LDP proposed in 199  1, in the wake of political 
corruption cases, to reform the electoral system. The draft included introduc- 
tion of the one representative per district (sho  senkyoku sei) system, along with 
proportional representation. The former works for the LDP, while the latter 
works for smaller opposition parties. The pretext was to reduce the need for 
fund-raising. But the proposal favored the LDP as a whole. The other parties 
opposed it for good reason. What was unusual was the opposition within the 
LDP, and the proposal was abandoned. If the LDP were serious about attracting 
voters and dominating the majority, it would have persuaded the members to 
adopt the proposal. 
9.4.4  Japan’s Agenda for Leadership in the Region 
Japan has not projected what kind of role it would play in the Pacific region 
or in the world. The lack of principles in the international context is not unre- 
lated to the lack of  positions in the domestic environment. This would not 
change even with U.S.  pressure. It is deeply rooted in the Japanese society and 
workings of hierarchy. 
Without projecting a position and an agenda, Japan will not be able to be- 
come a regional s~perpower.~~  Possible scenarios for Japan’s taking leadership 
are described here. 
50. In many cases, age means natural age. To be precise, however it is the years since an individ- 
ual joined the bottom of the hierarchy. Corporations hire students fresh out of college, and promo- 
tion, through screening and attrition, goes with age. Government hierarchy (in the fast track) goes 
with years since joining the ministry. Academic promotions in universities depend on criteria 99 
percent dominated by age, not by merit or publication. Probably 90 percent of positions for minis- 
ters are allocated by  number of reelections to the House of Representatives. No one is supposed 
to slide into the top or the middle of Japanese hierarchy. 
51. Literature in labor economics shows that shirking among workers could be avoided by  an 
incentive structure. One solution is deferred payments, such as higher wages with longer tenure 
and pensions, with a threat of dismissal. This works in extreme form in a Japanese hierarchy. 
52. Of course, there are costs and benefits to being politically assertive. Gilpin (1981) discusses 
this point. His assumption states: “A  state will seek to change the international system through 
territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal 
to or greater than the marginal benefits” (106). In this section, my working hypothesis is that it 418  Takatoshi Ito 
East Asian model of  development. The World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, with influence from the United States, have promoted a free market ap- 
proach to developing countries. The approach emphasizes deregulating import 
controls, price controls, and other restrictions right from the beginning. How- 
ever, the Japanese model of economic development seems different from this 
approach. The development strategy carefully nurtures infant industries by 
protecting domestic markets from imports and by giving tax breaks or prefer- 
ential government loans or subsidies. The pattern has been repeated by Korea 
and Taiwan in developing export industries. The strategy appears to be success- 
ful in transforming low-income countries into newly developed nations. It is 
crucial to those countries to have markets for their exports to earn foreign cur- 
rency. If  Japan could stand up and defend the economic policies of up-and- 
coming nations, such as Thailand and Malaysia, from the U.S. assault on regu- 
lations and import restrictions as well as pressure on export restraints, this 
would be leadership. There is some sign of change in Japan’s attitude toward 
a development strategy, especially in World Bank policymaking. However, it 
remains to be seen how  strong Japan’s challenge to the traditional approach 
would become. 
Human rights. Human rights violations occur periodically in Asian countries, 
as in  any other region in the world. Until now, the United States responded 
to human rights violation quickly and decisively. Japan and some European 
countries are reluctant to take measures against human rights violations. Japan 
responded very  late  to  the Tiananmen Square incidents, compared to  the 
United States and Europe. Japan was the first to resume aid to China after the 
incident. Japan did little against the Myanmar government for its house arrest 
of  San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner of  1991, or Indonesia for its 
killings in the East Timor incident. In either case, Japan could have used its 
official development assistance (ODA) muscle to press for democracy. How- 
ever, this does not seem to be Japan’s style so far. 
Antiweaponry policy. A principle that Japan could embrace more easily than 
human rights is an ODA for peace enforcement. As its constitution dictates, 
Japan has a clean record for not exporting weaponry. In  order to enforce re- 
gional stability, Japan may take up a principle of not providing ODA for coun- 
tries that export or import weaponry. 
Regional bloc. In a sense, Japan could respond to the call from Mahathir for 
forming the EAEG. It could be a regional counterproposal to the European 
Community (EC) and NAFTA. If this regional development takes place, Japan 
is neither sustainable nor desirable in the long run to  have a strong economic presence without 
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will have to play a significant role, whether it likes to or  not. Given that the 
United States firmly opposed a move such as the EAEG, this will be on Japan’s 
agenda only when the EC and NAFTA are closed to Asian nations. I consider 
this to be only remotely possible. 
9.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have argued the following points: First, U.S. pressure in the 
past can be classified into three types. Second, the traditional and market ac- 
cess pressures on Japan and other East Asian countries were not necessarily 
resisted, though neither were they welcomed, by  Asian countries, because of 
some domestic merit to the pressure. Third, the results-oriented pressure has 
been intensely hated by Japan and others because it unilaterally benefits U.S. 
producers. Fourth, resistance to pressure is not likely to turn Japan away from 
the United States in favor of  Asian countries, because the trade relationship 
needs the United States as an absorber of Asian countries’ products and Japan 
lacks leadership in the region. 
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Comment  Frances McCall Rosenbluth 
I  commend Takatoshi Ito for taking seriously the charge of  the conference 
organizers to integrate politics and economics in his analysis. He examines the 
Frances McCall Rosenbluth is professor of  political science at the University  of  California, 
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history of United States-Japan  economic relations and looks for ways macro- 
economic forces and micropolitical incentives interact. I agree with much of 
the paper. But as the designated political scientist kibitzer, I would like to focus 
on Ito’s characterization of Japan’s political system. A more complete model of 
Japanese politics will allow us to understand Japan’s actions better and there- 
fore to predict Japan’s responses to pressures from the United States more accu- 
rately. 
Ito’s characterization of  Japan’s political system is perhaps best illustrated 
by  a subtheme running through his paper, decrying Japan’s  lack of political 
leadership. Ito raises the leadership issue in the introduction and returns to 
it again periodically, concluding that the “biggest stumbling block to Japan’s 
becoming a regional economic and political leader is lack of principles.” Ito 
seems to suggest that this stems from a domestic political system that deters 
decisive action, hence robbing Japan of important opportunities to assert itself 
on the international stage. 
Although Japan’s political system has difficulty acting speedily, as I will 
argue later, this depiction of an indecisive and clumsy Japan tripping over its 
own feet is not entirely convincing. Japan has good reason, in fact, to maintain 
a low international profile. Even in a post-Cold  War world, Japan continues to 
rely on the United States for much of its defense. Second, as long as Japan’s 
exporters rely disproportionately on U.S. markets for their viability, it is unre- 
alistic to assume Japan could improve its welfare by asserting itself more force- 
fully. Japan’s leadership still sees the country’s interests served better by  sup- 
porting than by challenging the United States. 
Japan is not likely to deviate substantially from its tried-and-true course of 
action, short of important changes in the benefits and/or the costs of the status 
quo. True, the benefits of strong ties with the United States could decline, par- 
ticularly if the United States begins to close its markets to Japanese products. 
Alternatively, the costs of challenging the United States could decline, due to 
a diversification of export and investment patterns away from the United States. 
But neither of these has yet occurred to a significant degree. 
To call Japan, as does much of the popular press, a “headless monster” inca- 
pable of concerted action is misconceived. Japan has a unitary, parliamentary 
system of  government that is more streamlined in many ways than the U.S. 
system, where power divides vertically between federal and state governments 
and horizontally between the executive and legislative branches. That Japanese 
bureaucrats rather than elected officials appear to handle many important deci- 
sions is precisely what one should expect in equilibrium in a parliamentary 
system. Politicians prefer to delegate routine policy decisions, and need to 
monitor and intervene extensively only when they face competition from an 
executive branch controlled by a different political party. 
However  streamlined, Japan’s  political  system  is  incapable  of  moving 
quickly for other reasons. Japan’s  electoral rules amplify the importance of 
blocs of votes and hence delay decisions that could hurt any group of constit- 
uents. It is commonly assumed in any representative government that, because 422  Takatoshi It0 
of collective action problems, organized groups are more advantaged than un- 
organized voters or consumers. But collective action problems operate with 
a vengeance in Japan. Japan’s single nontransferable vote (SNTV), multimem- 
ber district electoral system pits members of  the ruling Liberal Democratic 
party  (LDP) against each othel: This forces members of  that party  (or any 
party seeking to gain a majority) to supply private goods-budgetary  and regu- 
latory favors, for example-to  mutually distinct groups of  voters rather than 
to appeal to a common party platform or label. 
Given the importance to LDP members of personal support networks and of 
campaign financing to nurture these blocs of votes, the party leadership faces 
ferocious opposition from within the party’s own ranks to policy measures- 
trade liberalization, for instance-that  alienate groups of supporters.  ’ Because 
Japan’s government is a parliamentary system, the LDP leadership hypotheti- 
cally could force its backbenchers to support policy decisions that are in the 
party’s overall best interests. But the LDP leadership also has to ensure the 
reelection of a Diet majority. As long as the LDP faces a vote-division prob- 
lem, the party cannot shift from a private goods, favor-based electoral strategy 
to a public goods strategy that emphasizes the interests of  the unorganized 
populace. Until the LDP undertakes electoral reform, Japan’s political leader- 
ship will liberalize Japan’s markets as little as possible but as much as neces- 
sary to avoid a showdown with the United States. 
In conclusion, I return to policy implications of Japan’s political system for 
the United States. I was  intrigued by  Ito’s open-minded attitude toward the 
“revisionists,” which separates him from most of  his economist brethren. I 
agree that Japan’s  markets are not open. But it is important that the United 
States pursue policies that will not backfire. 
I share Ito’s profound skepticism about the wisdom of  a Fallowsian eco- 
nomic containment strategy against Japan. The LDP is slowly opening Japan’s 
markets because of pressure from Japan’s exporters, for whom the probability 
and expected costs of U.S. trade retaliation have risen steadily in recent de- 
cades. Demographic change, in particular the rising proportion of urban sala- 
ried workers as a proportion of voters, is also forcing the LDP to reconsider its 
proproducer policies, 
The United States would do well to support the voices in Japan that favor 
market opening by pressing for greater access to foreign competitors, without 
alienating the Japanese public through unilateral market closure or high-profile 
posturing. But the United States should be prepared to be patient in the short 
run. Only when the LDP manages to jettison farmers and other uncompetitive 
sectors from its coalition-which  it is attempting to do through electoral re- 
form-can  the United States expect to see dramatic changes in Japan’s trade 
policy. 
1. Note that the LDP would have little incentive to retain the rnalapportionment of districts in 
favor of farmers were it not for the farmers’ organizations that  help the LDP divide the vote in 
rural districts. 